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Viewing constitutional law from a global perspective informs us
about trends and concurrences that might otherwise go unnoticed. The
main focus for this paper is how a new European legal tradition is being
forged from two of the most influential Western traditions, the common
and civil law. The term hybridization is used to refer to this phenomenon
whereby there is convergence between different legal systems. This does
not necessarily alter national sovereignty or substitute one system over
another. It cannot be measured by success or failure of one legal system
over another. It is a common sharing that is best understood through an
understanding of the constitutional and legal culture of different
countries. In the first instance this hybridization was driven by private
law. This has now given way to a European Administrative Law with
important constitutional consequences, particularly for the role of courts
and institutions. The hybridisation process in the European Union
provides an important example for comparative law. The Treaty of
Lisbon is the most recent manifestation of how convergence of legal
systems in 27 Member States may be achieved while maintaining
elements of national and legal sovereignty at the level of the Member
State. It holds lessons for the study of constitutional law and its analysis
in a global environment. Human rights -similarly may provide an
overarching framework that permits hybridization while retaining
national societal influences. In that context Japan is a useful case study
that similarly shows how adaptation may be accommodated through
importing different legal systems while retaining national cultural and
societal attitudes. Hybridization requires legal transfers to be studied but
equally to recognise the constitutional, legal and cultural consequences
of change.
* Professor of Law, University of Warwick.
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INTRODUCTION
Hybridization in constitutional terms means transposing ideas and
concepts from different legal systems, partly as a part of modernisation
but also as a consequence of globalisation. In the previous century, it
manifested itself in the import and export of legal systems as a
consequence of re-building after the Second World War but also a
reorientation of cultures and legal systems to adapt to the prevailing
social order. It is remarkable how the fluidity of change has given rise to
many common phenomena; trade and market conditions gave rise to
globalisation of different markets across many sectors of economic
activity including financial and banking. Constitutional scholars' have
not always appreciated the significance of hybridization.2 National
sovereignty is often unimpaired by the process leaving the general
constitutional framework intact. Often, hybridization as a phenomenon
is left to be studied in the context of comparative law3 or international
1. P.P. Craig, Constitutions, Property and Regulation, PUB. L. 538 (1991).
2. See generally id.
3. See generally K.Z. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (Tony Weir, trans., Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 1998); see also ERIC
DESCHEEMAEKER, THE DIVISION OF WRONGS: A HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE STUDY
(Oxford University Press 2009).
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law.4 It is also part of a debate over what David Nelken calls "the
sociology of legal adaptation." 5 One focus is on the study of how best to
use legal adaptation to engineer results. Another focus is on how law is
inseparable from the social and cultural context in which legal rules
operate. In terms of legal effects, evaluating how legal transplants work
is part of understanding changes in society.6 The outcome of the debate
on why and how to study legal transitions and borrowing from one legal
system to another is also relevant. Lawrence Friedman suggests that it is
important to think about the study of the processes of diffusion,
borrowing and imposition of law. Adopting Friedman's solution allows
the study of the relationship between States and the emergence of
commonalities resulting from either shared values-such as human rights
and the market economy, or finding that economic growth may
encourage legal and social reforms. 7 The Anglo-American tradition has
come under the influence of continental Europe and the on-going
transformation of legal systems in a period of globalisation.
Common lawyers are particularly curious about the influence of the
civil law as it is generally expected to have major potential for altering
the way the common law will develop. Civil lawyers seem less
concerned about how common and civil law systems adapt and change,
though it is generally accepted that techniques of the common law may
be usefully employed in the civil law. Lawyers from the common law
4. Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES
13 (David Nelkin, ed., Dartmouth University Press, 1997). See also Lawrence M.
Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 65 (1996); see generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of Legal Culture: A
Reply, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 33-40; see also W. Ewald, Comparative
Jurisprudence II: The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 498-510
(1995).
5. See generally David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 7-54 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest, eds., Hart Publishing
2001).
6. W. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence II." The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 498-510 (1995). This approach is taken by Ewald and Watson in
seeking to look at law and lawyers rather than law in society. See also ALAN WATSON,
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (University of Georgia
Press, 2d 1983). See generally Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal
Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (1983); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE
LAW (University of Georgia Press, 1991).
7. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants,
in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 92-94 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., Hart
Publishing: Oxford 2003); Comment on Roger Cotterrell, Is there a logic of Legal
Transplants?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 71 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds.,
Hart Publishing: Oxford 2003).
8. Jean-Bernard Auby, Collection Droit Administratif: Transatlantic Perspectives
on Administrative Law, Address the at the Administrative Law Discussion Forum,
University of Montpellier, France (May 2008). I am very grateful to Thomas Perroud,
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tradition find that in the process of law reform acceptance of the civil law
tradition is enhanced by the imports of codes. Codification facilitates the
export and import of ideas. Common methodologies provide readily
adaptable ways to assist the transportation process. Considering the
significance of hybridization is particularly important today as many
common problems in the way the citizen and government engage may be
more readily understood outside the national legal system. It is argued
that constitutional lawyers ought to take account of the constitutional
implications for hybridization, not to engineer the results but more to
consider how best to evaluate what the process has achieved. Different
ways of holding government to account and ensuring due process are
matters that may become more clearly understood by studying how legal
systems have many common principles. Influences that shape the
sharing of values and legal principles are also worth examining as
seemingly common procedures may be differently interpreted and
applied. The processes of transplanting and borrowing common and
civil law systems must also be examined in the context of the rise in
Islamic law and in Islamic countries this adaptation of different legal
systems is worth examining.
The organisation of the article is as follows: The historical
foundations of hybridization are first considered illustrating that it is not
a recent phenomenon, but one that has been ongoing for several
centuries. Next consideration of the European Union (EU) is explained
as a good example of how hybridization processes are at work. The
coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in November 2009, makes the
EU topical since the Treaty of Lisbon came after the failure to implement
an EU Constitutional Treaty. This is indicative of how hard it is to lead
with change focused through Constitutional adaptation rather than
through the convergence of common legal principles and procedures. In
the EU context particular attention is given to the value of human rights
and how human rights may be adapted into the constitutional fabric of
the United Kingdom consistent with UK sovereignty.
Japan is a clear example of how the process of hybridization has
taken shape since the Second World War. As we shall see in more detail
below, evaluating the Japanese experience provides a useful case study
and this forms the last section. Finally some conclusions are advanced
addressing concerns about how hybridization may ultimately change the
dynamics of how legal systems in a constitutional sense adapt and absorb
changes while preserving their own essential characteristics.
University of Paris I Sorbonne, France, for his assistance in finding the collection and
bringing this to my attention.
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HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN
COMPARATIVE LAW
It has already happened in European legal history that diffusion and
convergence have led to the hybridisation of ideas that later formed basic
legal doctrines. Assimilation and merger were significant influences in
the transformation of the law of contract. James Gordley's, The
Philosophical Foundations of Modern Contract Doctrine shows how
underlying the common law and civil law systems are many similarities
in terms of legal concepts and doctrinal structures.
9
Contract law is a good example because it transposes national
boundaries and is primarily driven by economic forces that in turn may
influence legal rules. David Ibbetson traces the emergence of the law of
restitution by noting how trade in the modem world was largely
influenced through the contract of sale. 10 In the early medieval European
world while sales were important, the transfer of reciprocal gifts by both
parties was more significant. The mark of a relatively undeveloped
economic system, gifts became a simple trading device that spread
throughout the trading world and eventually found source in the early
written laws of Norway and Sweden. Finding legal form took time. The
use of oaths became common place and various forms of pledges or
tangible objects allowed the debtor and creditor to rely on promises.
Sharing common obligations or experiences was also frequently used in
creating a bond or ensuring reliability. Writing down such agreements
took time but may be traced back to the middle of the second century
AD. The law distinguished between obligations that arose of some
wrongdoing (delict) as distinct from contract (as it then became).
Justinian's Institutes catalogued various wrongs and also various
contractual obligations. As the English common law took shape it fell
under many influences-specifically borrowing from Roman law and at
times assimilating ideas and writings-filling in gaps and fitting changes
in the rules to modem circumstances. Adaptation and change; removing
anomalies and inconsistencies; responding to new ideas and recognising
changing economic circumstance were all at work. One remarkable part
of changing circumstances was the codification movement in evidence
from the 1 8 th and 19th centuries in England. This ambition is still to be
9. See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILoSoPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991).
10. DAVID IBBETSON, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
284-92 (Oxford University Press 2001).
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realised in the present century but it is evidence of the influence of
continental and codified systems on the common law.1"
In the last century the Uniform Commercial Code composed of
restatements, model codes and co-operation through uniformity of
practice took shape in the United States "to provide an orderly statement
of the general common law of the United States." In effect the
Commercial Code created harmonisation and simplification that
overrides many local exceptions and practices. In Europe, it is through
the European Union that many private law ideas embracing unification
and harmonisation have taken shape.
There are some countries that have created hybrid legal systems-
Japan is one example where early Chinese influences that created a
Japanese common law have given way to late 19th century codes drawn
from France and Germany. After the Second World War Japan's
constitution drew on many Anglo-American values that are accompanied
by Western attitudes to law and legal issues.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND A COMMON EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE
The European Union offers an example of how idealism and ideas
may be transposed into operating doctrines and principles. Hybridisation
is at the heart of this endeavour. Underlying this are certain assumptions
including that there is a common set of principles and concepts genuinely
on offer to all Member States; that ultimate codification or assimilation is
desirable and achievable; and finally that despite national and cultural
differences, a common European legal culture will dominate. This has
led to an intense debate between euro-sceptics and pro-euro enthusiasts.
In terms of the future direction and debate the pros and cons of Europe
under a unified legal system are being challenged and discussed. Yet the
evidence suggests that much has already taken place to bring into
existence a European private law.' 2 There is currently a movement in
favour of a European Civil Code or more precisely a Code of Contract
law. The Common Frame of Reference currently being developed is an
example of the methodology used to bring together different sets of
assumptions and create general rules and principles in a single document.
The idea is to provide some general restatement of the law containing
legal principles, rules and guidance for interpretation and supplementary
11. See Oreste Pollicino, The New Emerging Judicial Dynamics of the Relationship
between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe, 76 Jean
Monnet Working Paper 14/08 (2008), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/
papers/08/081401 .html.
12. See generally Jan M. Smits, Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a
New Jus Commune?, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin Orucu & David Nelken
eds., Hart Publishing 2007).
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notes. This is largely juridical in form and is practical rather than
theoretical or academic. The unity of the European Union may not be
taken for granted and despite differences in perspectives considerable
progress has been made spanning different sectors from government led
initiatives to private sector input and from non-governmental institutions
or private individuals. There is a long historical legacy that goes back to
the codification movement which has met with varying degrees of
success. There are many examples where the EU has addressed issues
common to its Member States. In the development of the financial
service industry there is the Lamfalussy Process permitting the EU
Parliament and Council to adopt legislation containing core values and
guidelines that allow specific regulators to coordinate and enforce
common rules and procedures in each of the Member States. 13 Another
example is the development of EU administrative law, also with common
procedures and principles.14 Comparative administrative law has great
potential. It can provide insights that improve regulatory systems, lead
to improvements in institutions and in decision-making more generally.
Procedural and institutional improvements may flow as well as a better
understanding of agencies, their design and accountability.' 5 There is
also a Social Justice Study Group intent on advancing common rules and
procedures. The aim in all these projects is to provide an inclusive
method of agreeing common principles even though in many Member
States there is resistance to replacing too much national legislation with
EU law. Taken together this represents a varied and diverse approach in
competition and consumer law particularly, which may ultimately form a
common law of Europe. As Zweigert and K6tz recognise:
Comparative law must go beyond national systems and provide a
comparative basis on which to develop a system of law for all
Europe; it can do this by taking particular areas of law such as
contract, tort, credit arrangements, company law and family law and
showing what rules are generally acceptable throughout Europe and
whether they are developing on convergent or divergent lines.
13. See generally Financial Services Authority, Lamfalussy, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
Pages/About/What/lntemationalleuropean/lamfalussy/index.shtm (last visited February
10, 2010).
14. See generally PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIvE LAW (Oxford University Press
2006).
15. Paul Craig, Democracy and Rulemaking Within -the EC: An Empirical and
Normative Assessment, in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 43-50 (Paul Craig &
Carol Harlow eds., Kluwer Law International 1998). See generally Mario P. Chiti,
Forms of European Administrative Action, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (2004).
16. Zweigert & K6tz, supra note 3, at 29-30.
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This may result in a European Civil Code, though this will depend on the
political and practical considerations of its application. It is inevitable
that constitutional questions will arise-for example resolving different
forms of accountability; ensuring good decision making and determining
how Member States and the EU are best able to cross-fertilize decision-
making. At the heart of such questions lies the fundamental role of the
European Court of Justice and how judges are able to engage within an
adequate constitutional framework. It is clear that constitutional lawyers
have an important role in understanding how best to study legal and
social changes that are a manifestation of the hybridization process.
Describing processes and changes is important. Equally important is
setting out the balance of powers between the citizen and the state in
terms of the framework of government accountability. The observations
that may come through the lens of the hybridization process are
important. Comparing and evaluating; analysing the absorption of
change; understanding the interaction between law and social, economic
and political cultures are valuable lessons to be gained. Measuring
success or failure is not as important as recognizing that law and legal
rules may not always drive forward change but come as a response to it.
The examples of the European Union and Japan, discussed below, raise
questions as to how important law really is when changes are clearly
driven through economic and political pressures. 7 Not all imports are
successful and many are viewed differently in the context of different
legal systems. The hybridization process is a road map that allows
discourse and discovery. The degree to which different legal transplants
take place and are recognised within the country changes with time as
does their interpretation. The Constitutional lawyer will always
recognise the apparent ease with which laws may be transplanted, but
they do not always take effect. As Harding has noted, "[I]n spite of
extensive legal transplantations, we should not expect the end result to be
a mirror image of Western law."'
' 8
The Treaty of Lisbon (2009)
The Treaty of Lisbon came into force on December 1, 2009 and
provides a good example of the hybridization process. 19 It illustrates
17. See generally Paul Kirchhof, The Balance of Powers Between National and
European Institutions, 5 EUR. L.J. 225 (1999).
18. Andrew J. Harding, Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East
Asia, in ADAPTING LEGAL CuLTURES 220 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., Hart
Publishing: Oxford 2003).
19. See generally Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (follow "Treaties" hyperlink; then
[Vol. 28:3
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how different legal systems can enter a dialogue through processes and
procedures that provide common approaches while preserving specific
national differences. 20 The Treaty of Lisbon was first concluded by the
27 Member States in Portugal on 1 9 th October 2007 and signed on 13th
December 2007.21 The Treaty amends the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (TEC), now renamed the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European
Union (TEU).22 Consequently the main amended text of both Treaties
are to be found in the main text of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty on
European Union is split into six titles and the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union is split into seven parts. There is a separate
document, the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is not in the text of
the treaties but is part of the primary law of the European Union. There
are also 39 Protocols attached to the Treaty of Lisbon containing more
detailed provisions that are legally binding. Finally there are 65
declarations that are not legally binding but provide an indication of the
political intention behind the Treaties.
follow "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007" hyperlink);
see also EUROPA-Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon-treaty/indexen.htm; The
LISBON TREATY: EU CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? (Stefan
Griller & Jacques Ziller eds., Association of Austria Publications 2008); European Union
Committee, The EU Reform Treaty: Work in Progress, 2006-7, H.L. 180; European
Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, 2007-8, H.L 62-I, 62-
II.
20. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon three major Treaties formed the main primary law
of the European Union. The Treaty of European Union (TEU) introduced by the
Maastricht Treaty; the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and the
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. There was a fourth Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community which expired on 2 3rd July 2002
after fifty years. There have been numerous other Treaties and Inter-governmental
agreements. The Treaty of Lisbon replaced the abandoned Constitutional Treaty of 2004
after France and the Netherlands refused to ratify it in mid-2005.
21. The Treaty must be ratified by all Member States and from 13 December 2007
until December 2009 the process of ratification took place according to the different
constitutional arrangements in force in each Member State. Ireland required a
referendum and this was unsuccessful in June 2008 when the vote was against
ratification. A further referendum took place on 2 nd October 2009 and this was
successful with a turnout of 58%, 67.1% voted in favour.
22. See Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 4-5 (repealed
by the Treaty of Lisbon). See also Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 2-6 [hereinafter TFEU Treaty] (previously known as the
Treaty on Establishing the European Community). The Treaty of Lisbon provides a new
institutional structure for the EU with a Permanent President and Foreign and Security
Secretary. There are also new Treaty amendment procedures and a legal personality for
the EU. There are three distinct competences within the EU. Exclusive competence
where only the EU may act; shared competence where the Union and Member States may
act and finally where the Union may carry out actions to support and co-ordinate the
actions of the Member States.
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The Treaty of Lisbon retains the pre-existing process begun in the
Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice that prepared the European Union for
its enlargement and attempted to provide greater coherence and
efficiency in its organisation. The main text of the Treaty of Lisbon
ensures that there is a transfer of the various competences under the
European Communities to the European Union. The pragmatic
development of the various competences of the European Union received
specific direction from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In
constitutional terms the ECJ has forged its role as having primacy of law
over Member States. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European
Community ceases to exist and is replaced by the European Union. The
legal order is formed around 27 Member States each with their own
distinct legal systems but with a convergence around the EU. The ECJ is
a quasi-constitutional court for the EU, covering the English common
law system, even though the ECJ has strong roots in the civil law
tradition shared by most Member States. Preserving some degree of
national sovereignty is a delicate balance. A good example is to be
found in Article 12 of the amended Treaty of European Union (TEU) and
in Protocols 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Taken together these
provisions ensure that national parliaments are brought into the
legislative process of the European Union (EU). Two new Protocols,
Protocols Nos. 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon have the intention of
involving national parliaments in the following way. All legislative
proposals will be sent to the national parliaments and parliament's
opinion may be expressed in terms of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. There is an eight-week time limit for reply. National
Parliaments are also involved in the general passerelle clauses and in the
evaluation procedures of Eurojust and Europol.23 The implications of the
Treaty of Lisbon for national parliaments will be an interesting area for
future study. It will provide diverse inputs into the legislative process.
This is likely to come under diffuse influences in terms of public service
provision and the interpretation of the margin of discretion residing with
Member States. It will also reflect different legal cultures and political
ideologies represented in each of the national Parliaments.
23. See TEU Treaty art. 48(6). Passerelles makes it possible for the scope of
qualified majority voting and the ordinary legislature procedure to be extended without
amending the treaty in force. The general passerelle is to be found in Article 48(6) TEU
and allows the European Council acting under unanimous voting to amend Part 3 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union so that the Council may act by
qualified majority in that area. See also TEU Treaty art. 16 (amended by the Treaty of
Lisbon article 35); TEFU Treaty art. 238; TEU Treaty protocol no. 11 (amended by the
Treaty of Lisbon); Hayes-Renshaw, et al., When and Why the EU Council of Ministers
Votes Explicitly, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD, 161 (2006).
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Treaty of Lisbon and Some Implications for Human Rights
The role of human rights is fundamental in the way legal systems,
including within the European Union engage in dialogue. Rights are
often overlooked in terms of studying divergent and convergent legal
influences. The Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter the Charter)
has gone through a gestation period. The original intention was to bring
together all the rights of citizens in Member States and in June 1999
Member States agreed to make fundamental rights part of a newly
drafted Charter of Fundamental Rights to become applicable in the EU.
In 2001 the Nice Treaty included the Charter of Fundamental Rights as
an aspirational statement of goals to be achieved by the EU. A revised
version of the Charter was signed between the Commission, the EU
Parliament and the Council in December 2007. Article 6 of the new
Treaty of the European Union (TEU) makes the necessary link between
the Charter and the European Union. However, from its inception and
prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter, as previously indicated, had an
aspirational status, but did not have legally binding effect. The Charter
has legal effect under the Treaty of Lisbon, but the UK and Poland fall
under Protocol 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, discussed below. 2 4  The
influence of the Charter, even in the UK and Poland cannot be
underestimated. It has become embedded in the culture of rights within
the EU and is influential in how the Commission undertakes its
legislative role. The setting up of the Fundamental Rights Agency to
offer a form of pre-legislative scrutiny is indicative of this influence.
The Court of Justice (ECJ) has also been influenced by the Charter even
before the December 1st, 2009 effective date as of the Treaty of Lisbon,
which has been treated in many ways as equivalent to a source of
international law. In a number of headline cases the ECJ has
acknowledged this influence and has felt duty bound to promote its
application in relevant cases.2 5 This underlines how, even though during
the period when the Charter was not legally binding, the Charter was
regarded as influential and significant. This will develop further, now
that the Treaty of Lisbon has come into force and will give the ECJ an
24. See generally Lisbon Treaty protocols; See also EUROPA-Treaty of Lisbon,
http://europa.eu/Iisbon-treaty/index-enhtm" Protocols provide more detailed provision
on specific areas that are generally found in the main text of the Treaty. There are 39
protocols attached to the treaties and they are also legally binding. The protocols are
attached to the main text of the Treaty of Lisbon.
25. See Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de
Ministerraad, 2007 E.C.R. 1-3633; Case C-305/05 Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et
Germanophones & Others v. Conseil des Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. 1-05305; Case C-540/03
Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-5769.
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important role in determining on a case-by-case basis how to interpret
the Charter integrated into European Union law.26
HUMAN RIGHTS AS A DOMINANT FORCE
It is unsurprising that human rights have become a dominant
influence in shaping hybridization.27 There is a universal sense that the
theory and practice of human rights is an important basis for
development. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various
related international conventions are fundamental. Human rights and
principles of democracy have provided enormous influence in post-
independence constitutional developments in many countries. In the
United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act 1998 has become a pivotal part
of the common law. In the European Union, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg has had to consider how within the EU
human rights are best considered. Most Member States follow the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights at Strasbourg. There is a potential for the two courts to
integrate and come to a common understanding on rights.
Initially, the EC institutions did not address human rights directly.
Gradually, however, the ECJ began to develop its own strategy despite
initial resistance to using human rights to interpret Treaty provisions.28
This has gradually given way to a more liberal recognition of rights that
are common to the various Member States. 29 Rights are considered
consistent with the overall objectives raised by the European
Community. In this approach there is a degree of deference to national
courts. In Bosphorous v. Ireland, the ECJ accepted that adequate
protection had been afforded through the Irish Supreme Court and it was
unnecessary to go beyond the protections within the Member State
provided that they were adequate.3 ° What has been less clear is the
extent to which Treaty making arrangements within the EU will advance
human rights. The Maastricht Treaty failed to settle this matter. The
Treaty of the (?) European Union provided that human rights (Article
6(2) EU) were a fundamental principle of EU law and that within the
fields of Justice and Home Affairs, there should be a human rights
26. See TEU Treaty art. 6 (providing that human rights are fundamental to the EU).
27. A.W. Brian Simpson, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE
GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 15-20 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).
28. See Case 4/73 Nold, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
29. Case C-94/00 Roquette Fr~res, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9011. See also Chappel v. United
Kingdom (1990) 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1990); Casey v. United Kingdom (1991) 13 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 189 (1991); Case 11/70 Internationale Handeisgesellschaft [1970] E.C.R. 1125
(1970).
30. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2006).
[Vol. 28:3
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dimension. Nevertheless, within the interpretation of Community law,
the ECJ developed principles that have a human rights resonance.
Proportionality, equality and fairness were interpreted as part of the
nature of the Communities. The Treaty of Nice moved the agenda to the
next stage by providing, as indicated above, an aspirational Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, drafted in June 1999. The
result was a common commitment as a Declaration of 15 personal
representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member
States and 16 members of the European Parliament and 30 members of
national parliaments. The Charter containing 53 articles makes
fundamental rights and freedom central for the EU citizen. In March
2007, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was established as an
Agency of the EU, to provide advice and assistance to EU institutions
and to support human rights.
Taken together these steps represent important and significant
stages in the development of EU law catalysed by the recognition of
human rights. The hybridization process is continuous and likely to
provide greater integration of legal rights into the different legal cultures
in Europe, particularly in light of the new text of Art. 6 of the Treaty of
the European Union, which provides that "[t]he Union recognises the
rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value
as the Treaties.'
The Charter of Fundamental Rights (The Charter)
The main intention behind the Charter of Fundamental Rights was
to convey all of the rights of European Citizens in the Union in a single
document.12  After many revisions, the Charter was signed by the
Presidents of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council
on 12th January 2007. Article 6 of the old Treaty of European Union
(TEU) made reference to the Charter and links the TEU to the Charter
giving it aspirational status.
The Treaty of Lisbon takes matters a step further by revising Article
6 TEU. Article 6(1) provides that the Charter will have the same legal
values as the Treaties. While not extending any of the competences of
the Union, it stipulates under the new Article 6(3) that "the Union shall
respect fundamental rights. 33 The important point is that the Charter,
including explanations and interpretation, falls under the jurisdiction of
31. TEU Treaty art. 6.
32. See The Charter of Fundamental Rights, Dec. 14, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1, 17.
33. See PAUL CRAIG, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 606-10 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008).
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the Court of Justice. While the explanations and interpretations do not
have the force of law, they are nonetheless influential. The nature of the
Charter is wide ranging and contains over 50 rights, freedoms and
principles. There are six titles: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity,
Citizens' Rights, and Justice.34 There is a great deal of ambiguity over
their interpretation especially in terms of rights and principles. This is
particularly important as rights are regarded as directly enforceable
whereas principles may only be justiciable under Article 52(5). The
distinction, such as it is, is likely to form the case law of the ECJ.
Principles may not be directly enforceable rights but they cover
matters that are likely to be the subject of litigation and therefore become
interpretation aids in the way the ECJ considers EU law. This is
especially so in the context of the duty of the Court to take account of
revised Article 6(3) TEU for the Union to respect fundamental rights.
Charter rights are broadly expressed and often provide economic and
social expectations, such as Article 35, the right of access to health care.
Very often such Articles may draw on pre-existing rights or obligations
found in other Treaties or in other parts of EU law. While rights may be
so general as to require little substance, such as Article 28 on the right of
collective bargaining and action, their significance should not be
underestimated. While no new rights are established and such rights
must be in accordance with national law, this opens up questions of
interpretation and emphasis. 35 Though it is probably common ground
amongst many commentators that the Charter may not extend EU law, it
leaves unanswered, however, how influential it may become when
interpreted. Particular concerns about the reach of Article 28 to create a
right to strike have so far been exaggerated. The ECJ may decide to
exercise self-control over how the right to strike applies and may respect
national limitations and restrictions while acknowledging the right itself.
It remains to be seen how the ECJ gives interpretation on a case by case
basis. UK courts will also have to wait and see how interpretations are
reached by the ECJ.
36
34. Id. at 609.
35. See Migration Watch UK, The European Reform Treaty Impact on Asylum and
Immigration Policy, March 14, 2008, http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/BriefingPaper/
document/82. See also HOUSE OF LORDS: EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE: THE TREATY OF
LISBON: AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 10th Report session 2007-08 H.L. Paper 62-I1,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/
62ii.pdf.
36. Address by Rt. Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, Human Rights and Civil Liberties,
Address to the Liberty Annual Conference: (Jun. 2, 2002). See also Address by the Rt.
Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, The Charter of Fundamental Rights, Address to the BIICL
(Jan. 15, 2008); HOUSE OF LORDs: EUROPEAN UNION COMMIrEE,: THE TREATY OF




The Charter and the Treaty of Lisbon
The rationale for giving the Charter legal status and binding effect
under the Treaty of Lisbon is well supported by most commentators.37
As the Charter is influential, it is preferable for this to be recognised in
law. This assists legal advisors in setting the terms of their advice to
clients, allows the arguments about rights to be adjudicated on its merits,
and brings positive advantages to European citizens in the way the law
develops. It is, however, unusual to give a document with aspirational
status recognition in a Treaty providing it with binding effect. In terms
of legal effect, this means that EU institutions have to give attention to
the fundamental rights of the Charter. Irrespective of Member States,
this is important as there are many instances where EU institutions will
change their behaviour because of the Charter and its legal binding
status. This is a positive development in terms of setting controls on EU
institutions; enhancing standards and improving rights for citizens over
institutions whose accountability in the past has been open to question.
The question of whether new or additional rights are created by the
Charter is unclear.3 8 It is unlikely that there will be a major change in the
ECJ's behaviour because of the change of status given to the Charter. It
is clear that the jurisprudence of the ECJ is likely to be influenced by the
Charter and this is an important point to consider. The possibility of
challenging acts of Member States and EU institutions is open, even
though some lawyers doubt that this is very likely.
Protocol 7 UK and Poland
Protocol 7 is the result of pressure from Poland and the United
Kingdom. 39 The Protocol states that the Charter does not extend the
ability of the Court of Justice to find laws within the two countries
"inconsistent" with the Charter. There is a further "opt out" namely that
nothing in Title IV of the Charter relating to solidarity, namely workers
rights will create any additional rights to those already granted in the two
countries. 40 The question arises as to whether the Protocol is an actual
opt out or simply a guide to interpretation? There is no clear answer.
The Government's intention appears to be that the Protocol is there to
37. Some substantial reservations are made about the Charter in Sir Francis Jacobs,
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: THE EUROPEAN WAY (HAMLYN LECTURES) 150, 151
(Cambridge University Press, 2007).
38. There is a useful discussion in chapter 5 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE
TREATY OF LISBON: AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT, REPORT, 2007-8 H.L. 62-I.
39. CRAIG, supra note 33, at 609.
40. See J.R. Shackleton, Industrial Relations Reform in Britain Since 1979, 19 J.
LABOUR RES. 581-605 (1998).
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establish that there can be no new rights and that the courts may not
strike down any UK law. However, falling short of what is inconsistent
allows the ECJ to read into the interpretation of UK law various parts of
the Charter to render UK law consistent. This approach is well within
the boundaries of interpretation and also in line with the EU's
fundamental protection of rights, which the UK has affirmed in the TEU
as well as under the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 2 of the Protocol
acknowledges that the Charter is applicable to the extent that it refers to
national laws and practices and to the extent that the rights or principles
are recognised by the laws and practices of the UK. There are a number
of other comments about the Protocol that may make its interpretation
open to speculation. The lack of clarity in the Protocol provides support
for the view that it is only there as an explanation of the various
interpretations rather than a binding opt out. If the intention was to
negotiate a fundamental opt out then this would be needed to be spelt out
in full and contain a clear explanation of the nature of the opt out and its
application. The ambiguity in the Charter between rights and principles
also makes it difficult to know whether the Protocol has much meaning
as the Protocol fails to make clear what is regarded as falling within the
Charter and general principles and what is not. In any event there are
pre-existing rights and obligations under EU law that are applicable to
the EU and the Protocol does not limit their application to UK law. The
general nature of the Protocol leaves a wide margin of appreciation for
national courts and the ECJ to decide how it applies and its effect. It is
likely that the overriding nature of EU law4' as accepted in the case law
of the EU would be followed.42 Cases such as Factortame are
influential. 3 Costa v. E.N.E.L. would apply as asserting the supremacy
of the ECJ and EU law."
41. European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2(1) (Eng.) (providing that "rights,
powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions ... are without further enactment to be
given legal effect").
42. See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Ondememing Van
Gend en Loos v. Neder-Landse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105
(discussing direct effect doctrine); Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 631
(discussing direct effect doctrine); Case 50/76, Amsterdam Bulb v. Produktschap voor
Siergewassen, 1977 E.C.R. 137 (expanding the direct effect doctrine through
Regulations). See also Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South West
Hampshire Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723; Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v.
La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, 1 C.M.L.R. 305
(1992); Case C-6/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993)
(discussing horizontal and vertical effect in all three cases).
43. R. v. Secretary for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd., 1989 2 C.M.L.R. 353;
[1990] 2 A.C. 85 (H.L) (U.K.); [1991] 1 A.C. 603. See also M. v. Home Office, [1994] 1
A.C. 377.
44. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and European Court of
Justice (ECJ): Strasbourg and Luxembourg
The legal status given to the Charter and its overlap or
interconnection with the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) may result in convergence between the two courts (Strasbourg
and Luxembourg). EU accession to the ECHR is likely and would
reduce room for inconsistencies of approach between the two courts.4 5
Unlike the European Union, there is no mandate in the Strasbourg Court
of Justice to unify human rights laws. The recognition is that rights may
be calibrated in different ways in different cultures. However, the
margin of appreciation doctrine, intended to give rise to different
approaches in domestic law, has not been interpreted with enough
flexibility to give rise to clear differences in approaches to human rights.
This has weakened the ability of domestic courts to develop their own
responses to rights, reflecting different legal, economic and social
differences. There are three discernible trends: The ECJ has developed
an increasing interest in taking account of the ECHR. This is clear from
decided cases and judicial attitudes.46 Furthermore, the ECJ is likely to
make use of the Charter as an interpretation aid as well as a source of
legal doctrine. The jurisdiction of both the ECtHR and the ECJ is likely
to be addressed at some time in the future. It is clear that UK courts are
free to refer to the Charter and interpret it as part of the general scope of
fundamental rights.47 By analogy it is clear that a similar approach to
interpretation was evident with the ECHR before the Human Rights Act
1998.48 The protocol does not prevent British courts from continuing in
this way. Similarly, British courts draw on many international
instruments as aids to interpretation when confronting human rights
issues. The ECJ will have to operate on a case-by-case basis when
deciding how to interpret the Charter. The existence of the Protocol may
encourage the ECJ to interpret rights generally drawing the Charter into
the fabric of the common law of the European Union. This will be
45. CRAIG, supra note 45, ch. 15.
46. N. Banforth, Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination under EU Law and the
European Convention on Human Rights: Problems of Contrast and Overlap (2006-7) 9
C.Y.E.L.S. 1.
47. R. v. East Sussex County Council and the Disability Rights Commission ex parte
A,B,X and Y, Eur. Ct. H.R. 167 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Article 3 Prohibition Against Torture in Ireland v. UK, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R.
25 (1978); Tyrer v. UK, (1978) 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1978); McCann v. UK, 20 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 99 (1995) (finding an Article 2 Positive duty to protect life); Osman v. UK, 1998-
VIII Eur. Ct. H.R 3124 ; Fox v. UK 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157 (1991) (finding an Article 5
Right to liberty and security); Brogan v. UK 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1988); R. v Secretary
of State for the Home Department ex p Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696 (finding an Article 10
Freedom of expression).
2010]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
difficult to resist as inevitably the Charter will influence how the ECHR
is interpreted and also the approaches taken by the two courts in
Luxembourg and Strasbourg.
In the future British courts will have to decide how to interpret the
Protocol. EU accession to the European Convention inevitably integrates
human rights and it should be remembered that the EU must give
primacy to fundamental rights. It is likely that the general direction of
travel towards an integrated approach to human rights in the EU will be
difficult to resist. The arguments in favour of this approach are
convincing as the application of rights will still retain a margin of
appreciation at Member State level. There is a need for clarity over the
impact of the Protocol, the integration of the Charter into the EU, and the
role of judges in the interpretation of rights. Lord Hoffman in his March
2009 lecture to the Judicial Studies Board alluded to this point in terms
of the contribution of British judges to the development of Convention
standards.49 This is an important point as the English common law
through its pragmatic and practical approach to legal problems may
provide a useful analytical basis on which to balance rights between
political and legal judgements.
In terms of hybridization of law and legal systems, it is also clear
that the margin of appreciation between legal and political judgements
over policy issues requires a fine balance. The former is nuanced in
appointed judges while the latter is found in elected and accountable
politicians. Constitutional lawyers will readily appreciate the need for
both legal and political evaluations to be contained in a legal system.
The United Kingdom's common law system places political analysis at
the apex of the decision-making process. The point is readily understood
in the context of planning law. The Secretary of State, an elected
minister, has the final say. In R (on the application of Alconbury
Developments Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport
and the Regions, the House of Lords considered how rights set out under
Article 6 of the ECHR may have an impact on how planning decisions
are made.50  Article 6 provides, "[E]veryone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal."5' An applicant for planning permission has a right of appeal to
the Secretary of State against any refusal or condition of planning
49. Lord Hoffmann, Annual Lecture at Judicial Studies Board: The Universality of
Human Rights (Mar. 19, 2009).
50. R. (on the application of Alconbury Dev. Ltd.) v. Sec. of State for the Env't,
Transport, and Regions, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, 325 at 70 (D.C. 2001) (appeal taken from
Q.B.).
51. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added).
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permission. The planning system effectively gives the final say to the
Secretary of State, an elected politician, who may include matters of
policy as part of the overarching responsibility to ensure that policy
issues are considered as part of the system. 52 The Secretary of State's
decision may be appealed to the High Court on the same basis as judicial
review.53 The appeal is seen as confined to legal issues, and the courts
do not consider the merits of the policy behind the decision. The
Secretary of State is, theoretically, responsible to Parliament for policy
matters.
The House of Lords considered the full implications of human
rights introduced under the 1998 Act for the planning system in
Alconbury and concluded that the court should not have every aspect of
planning law fall under the scope of review.54 To ensure that the relevant
human rights procedures are followed, it was sufficient that there should
be a review of the legality of the decision. 5 It fell within the Secretary
of State's remit, including policy matters, to determine appeals.56 Thus,
while the House of Lords recognizes the requirements of the Human
Rights Act, this Act does not require judicial intervention in every aspect
of the planning system, which is already susceptible to judicial review.57
This illustrates the court's sensible case-by-case approach.
It is also important to recognize that legal rights developed under
the Human Rights Act of 1998 have the potential to shift Britain's
constitutional arrangements in a new direction. The Court of Appeal in
October 2001, in a series of significant judgments, outlined the
significance of the Human Rights Act in terms of the powers of the
courts to issue injunctions in matters of planning disputes. 8 Issues of
proportionality need to be considered by the courts before an injunction
may be exercised under the discretionary powers of the courts to issue
52. Section 77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 amended by the Town
and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) (Amendment) (England) Order
2009 (SI 2009/453). Circular 05/00 Planning appeals procedures (including inquiries into
called-in planning applications). The Planning Inspectorate: Procedural Guidance:
Planning appeals and called-in planning applications PINS 01/2009 (London, 2009).
53. Section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 amended by the Town
and Country Planning (Hearings and Inquiries Procedure) (Amendment) (England) Rules
2009 (SI 2009/455).
54. R. (on the application of Alconbury Dev. Ltd.) v. Sec. of State for the Env't,
Transport, and Regions, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, 325 at 70 (D.C. 2001) (appeal taken from
Q.B.).
55. See id. at 305.
56. Id. at 333, 97.
57. Id. at 300.
58. S. Bucks Dist. Council v. Porter, [2004] UKHL 33 (appeal taken from [2003]
EWCA Civ. 687). See also Environmental Data Services, Report 323, 57,
http://www.ends.co.uk/index.htm.
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injunctions for threatened breaches of the law.59 This is one example of
the importance of the rights culture becoming an integral part of the
judicial process.
Professor Ewing notes the danger of the unelected (judges) making
important decisions over the elected (ministers):
We now have a constitutional system in which the output of the
democratic process can avoid successful challenge and possible
censure only if it can pass a test of democracy developed by a group
of public officials who have escaped all forms of democratic scrutiny
and accountability.
60
The essence of such a danger appears to be addressed in part by the self-
limitations on judicial powers set out in Alconbury. The potential for
conflict between the principle of democratic decision-makers and judges
is at the centre of the Alconbury decision, as Lord Hoffmann explained:
There is no conflict between human rights and the democratic
principle. Respect for human rights requires that certain basic rights
of individuals should not be capable in any circumstances of being
overridden by the majority, even if they think that the public interest
so requires. Other rights should be capable of being overridden only
in very restricted circumstances. These are rights which belong to
individuals simply by virtue of their humanity, independently of any
utilitarian calculation. The protection of these basic rights from
majority decision requires that independent and impartial tribunals
should have the power to decide whether legislation infringes them
and either (as in the United States) to declare such legislation invalid
or (as in the United Kingdom) to declare that it is incompatible with
the governing human rights instrument. But outside these basic
rights, there are many decisions which have to be made every day...
in which the only fair method of decision is by some person or body
accountable to the electorate.
61
59. M. Purdue, The Human Rights Act 1998, Planning Law And Proportionality Vol.
6(3) ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 161-173, 171.
60. K.D. Ewing, The Unbalanced Constitution, in SKEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 116-17 (Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing & Adam Tomkins eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2001).
61. R. (on the application of Alconbury Dev. Ltd.) v. Sec. of State for the Env't,




HYBRIDIZATION-A CASE STUDY OF JAPAN
Japan62 is a good example of how different legal systems may
become intertwined with interesting results in terms of process,
procedures and the role of law and lawyers. 63 The idea of Japan as a case
study of the reception of foreign law is not new.64 There are differences
in opinion as how to interpret and recognise Japan's legal system. Some
scholars favour an emphasis on the distinctive way Japan's culture
adopts legal rules and applies procedures and processes in a unique
way.65 Others see the rules as little different from other legal systems
that have adapted foreign imports and focus on the common nature of
legal rules and their practices. This has given way to a long debate about
law and its reception. Japan has not disappointed scholars who wish to
follow different perspectives. It is one of the few developed industrial
societies that built its development around legal changes that allowed
economic growth within the parameters of Japan's national economy and
62. I am very grateful to Dr Michael Reddish and Michael Winning for their
inspiration and ideas on Japanese law. Both have co-taught on the Japanese Law and
Culture module at the University of Warwick. They have provided useful references on
Japanese Law. I am greatly in their debt. I am also grateful to countless students of
Japanese law who have enlivened my understanding as a response to the lectures
delivered in the module. Final thanks to Professor Michiatsu Kaino of Waseda
University, Tokyo for his support and friendship throughout many years.
63. See e.g., JAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM (Harald Baum ed., De
Gruyter 1997); LAWRENCE BEER & H.IROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF
JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 (Univ. Wash. Press 1996); HERBERT P. Bix, HIROHITO AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (HarperCollins 2000); KENT E. CALDER, CRISIS AND
COMPENSATION (Princeton Univ. Press 1988); RON DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY
(Athlone Press 1987,); JOHN 0. HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (Univ.Georgia
Press 1998); DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION IN JAPANESE LAW, TOKUGAWA AND
MODERN (Univ. Wash. Press 1965), JOHN MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN
(Univ. Wash. 1964); LAW IN JAPAN (A. Von Mehren ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963);
CIE NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY, REVISED EDITION (Penguin Publishing 1973); MASAO
MARUYAMA, STUDIES IN THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TOKUGAWA JAPAN (Univ. Tokyo
Press 1974); MASAO MARUYAMA, THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR IN MODERN JAPANESE
POLITICS (Oxford Univ. Press 1963); YOSHYtUJK NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW
(Univ. Tokyo Press 1976); T.J. PEMPEL, REGIME SHIFT (Cornell Univ. Press 1998); M.
RAMSEYER & N. NAKAZOTO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Univ. Chicago
Press 1999); KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POST-WAR CONSTITUTION
(Westview Press1998); HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (Tokyo Univ.
Press 1982); RYUSAKU TSUNODA, SOURCES OF JAPANESE TRADITION (Columbia Univ.
Press 1958); R. WARD & Y. SAKAMOTO, DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN (Univ. Hawaii Press
1987).
64. Takao Tanase, The Empty Space of the Modern in Japanese Law Discourse, in
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 187 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., Hart Publishing:
Oxford 2003).
65. See e.g., C. GLUCK, JAPAN'S MODERN MYTHS: IDEOLOGY IN THE LATE MEIJI
PERIOD (Princeton Univ. Press, 1985); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual
Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE
L.J. 604 (1985).
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business ethos. For many years Japan's lifetime employment, highly
educated society and group culture succeeded in ways that far exceeded
Western economies. The lesson from Japan's economic miracle has
engaged economists and political scientists in an effort to explain and
benefit from Japan's success. 66 Inevitably the legal system is likely to
have a part to play in how Japan's economy developed.67 It is not clear
to what extent law and legal principles were a pivotal influence. It is
clear that studying Japan's culture is the necessary first step in
understanding why and how legal transplants have taken shape,
especially in the context of the many social, political and economic
transitions that Japan has undergone.
68
Japanese law has undergone at least three periods of adaptation to
outside influences that are relevant to the hybridization process. In the
early medieval period the pre-dominant influence came from Chinese
Codes. 69  Roughly translated and adapted, they became a major
influence, though their actual application and reliance is difficult to
calculate. It is clear that the Chinese law had a unique quality for Japan.
The influence extended beyond the formalities of law to Japanese
culture. As John Haley suggests:
66. See EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA (Harvard
Univ. Press 1979).
67. See Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in
MIRROR OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS OF MODERN JAPAN 48-64 (S. Vlastos ed.,
Univ. Cal. Press 1998).
68. See YOSHIYU NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW (Anthony H. Angelo
trans. and ed., Univ. Tokyo Press 1976); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, J. MARK RAMSEYER, &
MARK D. WEST, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY
(Foundation Press 2006).
69. There are three historical periods in Japanese history: The Tokugawa Period
(1600-1868), the Meiji Period (1868-1912), and the modem democratic Japanese
Constitution (1946 to the present day). Earliest law books may be found in the first
century AD: chronicles of the "han dynasty" and drawn from Chinese books and codes.
Japanese law from the 3 d to 4b" century was derived from religious practice to know the
will of the Gods. 7th century Japan followed Chinese examples of national cohesion, and
the need for imperial and centralised power was under threat from powerful family
dynasties. Codes were modelled on China. An agrarian society beset with a strong
Confucian ideal that all land and persons were under the authority of imperial authority.
Taxation was redistributive but authority was given to high standing officials. A military
class emerged-the samurai transferring power from the centre to local and provincial
warlords. The description of feudal rule is appropriate because of the tendency of large
clans to gain control and this included land and its wealth. Japanese conceptions of law
were linked to early religious and philosophical influences. The Shinto (Trans. "The way
of the Gods" sacred practices and beliefs)-the Japanese were a divine race and
connected to the practice of ancestor worship--a great spiritual and religious experience
related to the forces of nature, land, sound, and inner control. Law is related to the will of
the Gods. See SOKYO ONO, WILLIAM P WOODARD, SHINTO: THE KAMI WAY (Tuttle
Publishing, 2003), JOHN K. NELSON, A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SHINTO SHRINE
(University of Washington Press, 1996).
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Japan's indigenous legal order reflected the imposition of Chinese
imperial institutions and concepts of law and governance not as a
result of external pressures as in other parts of Asia but rather by
indigenous rulers in a kinship-based society in which both deity and
rule remained particularistic. Between the fifth and eighth centuries
these rulers recast tribal Japanese communities only partially into
what they designed as a variant of a sinofield state. Their
introduction of imperial Chinese law along with a written language,
religion, technology and the arts recreated Japanese civilization. For
a millennium law was in effect defined in terms of imperial Chinese
notions.
70
Consequently the framework for the study of Japanese law requires an
understanding of Japan's culture, religious beliefs and practices as well
as formal law itself.
71
The second major influence is generally described as the Meiji
period. Japan was anxious to adapt its largely feudal society to a modem
market economy. The adaptation of German and French Codes was
undertaken first through translations and then through choices made in
terms of the needs of Japanese society and its cultural requirements. The
adoption of largely German Codes accorded with authority under the law
and the concept of "rule by law" (Rechtsstaat). The latter provided an
important underpinning to the Imperial Japanese Constitution 1889.
Modem in construction and recognising an elected government and
limited separation of powers between legislature and judiciary, the Meiji
Constitution vested considerable powers in the Emperor, a divinity of
power defined by hereditary male lineage. The Emperor had legislative
powers and had authority to rule with supreme command of the army and
the right to declare war, make peace and conclude treaties. The
authoritarian order reflected in the Meiji Constitution preserved imperial
power until Japan's defeat at the end of the Second World War. Part of
the Meiji legacy endures through the various Civil and Criminal Codes
and their procedural supplements, as part of the law relating to civil and
criminal matters in Japan.
The third major influence that Japan came under was less out of
choice and more of necessity. The closure of the Second World War and
Japan's defeat left the General Headquarters of the United States with the
necessity to engage in constitutional drafting.72  The Japanese
70. JOHN 0. HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 7 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1998).
71. J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000).
72. The United States Government through the objectives of the Potsdam declaration
required constitutional reform. See State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, SWNCC-
228: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System, 1 (Nov. 27, 1945),
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Constitution1946 provided a rich Anglo-American influence into the
heart of Japanese legal society. The three pillars in which the
Constitution was based included the rule of law and individual human
rights; the renunciation of war or pacifism (Article 9)73 and the
development of democratic government outside the control of the
Emperor who became under the 1946 Constitution a symbol, 74 in marked
contrast to his Imperial status in the Meiji Constitution (1889). 7' A
further extension of Western democratic influence is that the 1946
Constitution defines sovereign authority in terms of the people of Japan
rather than the Constitution itself. This is a clear shift in Japanese
obedience from authority and law under an Emperor under the Meiji
Constitution of 1889, to the democratic choices of the people in elected
government. Under the 1946 Constitution, Japan has emerged as a
democratic country with economic and industrial achievements that have
made it the second largest economy in the world.76
The effects of the 1946 Constitution are regularly debated in Japan.
One focus is on the Rule of Law, a product of Anglo-American
jurisprudence and the rule by law (Rechsstaat), an influence from
German law. The blend of universal principles found in the Rule of Law
and Japan's own analysis of rights and liberties makes for an interesting
analysis. Japan's attitude to rights is not comparable with the Western
approach to individual rights of citizen's against state power.
Constitutional lawyers will also readily recognise that the role ascribed to
the Japanese Constitution to provide checks and balances on unlimited
executive power through a superior status given to the Constitution is not
necessarily well understood in Japan. The Japanese Constitution also has
an element of paradox in its construction. Article 81 recognizes the
concept of judicial review, vesting the Supreme Court as "the court of
last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law,
order, regulation or official act., 77 In contrast, Article 41 provides that
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/O3/O59/O59tx.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
See also Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM (Hideo Tanaka & Malcolm D.H. Smith eds., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1976.).
73. KENPO, art. 9 ("Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish
the aim of the preceding paragraph land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential
will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be
recognised.").
74. HERBERT P. Bix, HIRoHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (Duckworth
2000).
75. MEiJKENPO (1889).
76. Percy R. Luney, The Constitution of Japan: The Fifth Decade, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. Nos. 1 & 2 (1990).
77. KENPO, art. 81.
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the Japanese Diet is the highest organ of state power and the "sole
lawmaking organ" of the State.78 The ability of Judges to "make Law"
when interpreting it is open to conjecture. This point is particularly
important when interpreting the Japanese Supreme Court where there are
a relatively small number of cases. 79 Hybridization is an important way
to examine legal and social processes at work that highlight many
important developments. The role of examining the hybridization
process is to perceive how change is adapted through different
influences-some social and economic others legal and constitutional.
Another focus in Japanese legal studies is on the relatively law
number of lawyers in Japan compared to equivalent countries and the
small size of law firms that are mainly situated in Tokyo. Foreign
lawyers are often confronted with many barriers to legal practise in Japan
and there is hot debate about its apparently low litigation rates. Some
Japanese scholars view this as due to apparent differences in attitude to
78. KENPO, art. 41.
79. To date there have been only eleven Supreme Court cases (10 reported and one
recently decided and unreported decision) in which an official act has been held to be
unconstitutional. They are as follows: 11 Keishu 1593 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 28 th
November 1962), the case on confiscation from the third party; 3 Keishu 265 (Supreme
Ct. Grand Bench, 4th April 1973); the criminal case on patricide; 4 Minshu 572 (Supreme
Ct. Grand Bench, 30th April 1975), the case on restriction on establishing pharmacies; 3
Minshu 223 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 14th April 1976), a case on equality of voting
right for the House of Representatives; 5 Minshu 1100 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 17
July 1985), a case on equality of voting right for the House of Representative; 3 Minshu
408 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 22" April 1987), the case on restriction on division of
woodland in joint ownership; 4 Minshu 1673 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 2 d April
1997), the Yasukuni Donation case; 7 Minshu 1 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 11th
September 2002 the case on restriction of state compensation for postal service; 7 Minshu
2028 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 14 h September 2005), the case on voting right of those
who living abroad; 7 Minshu 1789 (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 4 th June 2008), the case
on nationality of an illegitimate child; (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 20th January 2010).
The eleventh the case on Sorachibuto Shrine is unreported has not been published but
was decided in 2010.
Of the ten published cases, there are three on equality of voting rights; three on
economic freedom, one on separation of the state and religion and another on patricide
and its treatment compared to ordinary homicide, one on the restriction of state
compensation for postal services and one on nationality law. The tenth case, the case on
nationality of an illegitimate child; (Supreme Ct. Grand Bench, 20 h January 2010T
involving the Supreme Court decision to strike down an official act was made on June 6
2008. The case concerned a nationality law of the Diet involving a challenge by ten
plaintiffs born of a Filipino mother but with a Japanese Father. In each case the parents
were not legally married and when the plaintiffs filed for Japanese nationality they were
turned down. Under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution, there is a guarantee of
equality. There were estimated to be tens of thousand of Japanese children with similar
claims. The Supreme Court considered that different attitudes to family life and parental
rights now prevailed in Japan. The decision was by majority opinion. There was a
general discussion as to how legitimacy might best be treated-through judicial
discretion or through the need for legislation.
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law such as found in the social-cultural background of the Japanese.
Kawashima argues:
Traditionally, the Japanese people prefer extra-judicial, informal
means of settling a controversy. Litigation presupposes and admits
the existence of a dispute and leads to a decision which makes clear
who is right or wrong in accordance with standards that are
independent of the wills of the disputants. Furthermore, judicial
decisions emphasize the conflict between the parties, deprive them of
participation in the settlement, and assign a moral fault which can be
avoided in a compromise solutions.
80
Kawashima's emphasis on compromise and the will of the parties
underpins important elements of Japanese group culture and the
preference not to lose face or avoid the primary intention of the parties.
This construction of Japanese attitudes to law and authority claims a long
inheritance back to earliest legal history and is reminiscent of the feudal
society and agricultural roots of pre-industrial Japan. Kawashima's
analysis is strongly contested by John Haley, who argues that the
Japanese are no more reluctant to litigate than in any other society.81
Haley has found compelling evidence to show that reluctance to
litigation may not be inferred from any cultural stereotype but from
systemic and procedural causes, such as delays in trials, the relatively
small number of lawyers, jurisdictional barriers that favour mitigation
rather than litigation, and the limited range of remedies available from
Japanese courts.82 However, the most serious limitation is the absence of
court powers of contempt to enforce decisions.83 The debate between
Kawashima and Haley is indicative of the benefits of dialogue over the
effects of hybridization in legal systems.8 4 Kawashima's attempt to link
Japan's social and economic culture to the apparently low litigation rate
is not particularly successful in the light of Haley's analysis.
Reconciling both approaches is possible if Kawashima is interpreted to
highlight the importance of understanding Japan's culture. Haley shows
how there are many aspects at work in the procedures and processes of
80. T. Kawahsima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN:
THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOcIETY 41-59 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963).
81. John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 359
(1978).
82. N. Urabe, Rule of Law and Due process: A Comparative View of the United
States and Japan in P. LuNEY AND K. TAKAHASHI, EDS., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(University of Tokyo Press, 1993) 174-78, 180-83.
83. J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan 18 J. LEGAL STUDIES 263 (1989).
84. Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident
Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 651 (1990).
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the legal system. Haley suggests in Authority without Power that the
relative weakness of many forms of law enforcement in Japan has a root
in the separation of authority from power.85 The consensual form of
Japanese governance is based on a high dependence on informal




Global markets have been a major force in shaping the import and
export of legal systems. Japan provides an example of how codes,
translated from France and Germany, were used at the end of the
nineteenth century during the Meiji period to speed up the economic
process and engage with new technology. Sharing analytical ideas that
may be used in a global setting is a dominant influence in approaching
legal problems. In recent times, particularly suited to this approach are
issues associated with climate change, the application of sustainable
development and more recently issues connected with financial
regulation. Privatisation and regulation have also provided the
development of market-orientated institutional changes that have been
applied throughout the world. Defining public goods and services and
their delivery through private sector companies together with contracts
and licenses set interesting points of comparison between common and
civil law systems. 87 This is a reflection of the different constitutional
traditions between the United Kingdom, for example, and France. What
is the role of law and regulation in the adaptation of different ideas about
regulation under privatised utilities? The question inquires into the
extent to which hybridization is taking place and how different elements
of universal and public services can be examined in differently
constructed markets. Legal culture provides an open-ended way of
exploring common experiences. War and economic emergencies are also
part of an on-going debate on accountability and measures to prevent or
deter corruption. Systems of regulation and criteria of effectiveness
achievable objectives need to be considered for within the constitutional
framework. Comparative law faces many challenges when confronted
85. JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER].
See also Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the
United States, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 461 (1986).
86. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 83, at 14. Japan's introduction
of citizen juries in the Summer 2009 is indicative of forging links with the general public
as part of the justice system.
87. T. Prosser, Marketisation, Public Service and Universal Service, in ADAPTING
LEGAL CULTURES 223 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest, eds., Hart Publishing 2003).
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by such issues. It must be rooted in an understanding of different legal
techniques and analysis; it must be capable of comparing and analysing
different procedures and legal cultures; and it must be capable of
providing a critical analysis of what works best and why. Evaluating
constitutional strengths and weaknesses requires an understanding of
what accountability means. Constitutional scholars have a specific focus
on drawing distinctions between legal, economic and political forms of
accountability as well as their need to be distilled in a way that reflects
the changing dynamics of the legal understanding of the comparative law
of human rights. Hybridization-a process of operating convergent and
even divergent ideas is common and at work across the world. The
European Union affords a glimpse of how different processes combine to
bring hybridization to reality. While policy is central to the work of the
European Commission, implementation is devolved to many agencies,
institutions, networks and contracting parties within Member States.
There is no single overriding method; different layers of administration
and structures have to be adapted in the process. There are, however,
common themes that emerge. In many instances the main operating
influences have come from the judiciary. In the United Kingdom the
values of the rule of law are often called in aid of an analytical approach
to rights. It is striking how within the European Union civil and common
law methodologies are increasingly intertwined. In the United Kingdom
the traditional oral approach to presenting cases has been carefully
incorporated into a case management system for civil and criminal courts
that pays increasing attention to affidavits and written skeleton
arguments. Conversely in many civil law countries, particularly France
there is an increasing recognition of the values of oral argument and
presentation of issues. As enlargement of the European Union takes
place Eastern and Western European legal systems are increasingly
coming together. There is a "judicial dialogue" at work between the
differing judicial values of the new entry countries and the common
identity found in the European Courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg.
This encompasses the scope of EU law and also the increasing role of
human rights.
Hybridization provides a setting for thinking about the processes at
work in the import and export of ideas. It is an important way to
examine legal and social processes that may point out many similarities
and differences in experiences. Legal transplants do not always have to
be successful or indeed achieve what may have been their original
intention. The adaptation of different legal families, particularly the
common and civil law provides a setting for future scholarship that
addresses social, economic and political problems from different
perspectives. The result may provide common understandings and novel
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ways to meet the challenges of the future. Setting priorities and
transposing ideas is the work of many different scholars. Constitutional
scholars have an important role in explaining contradictions, outlining
the restraints on the abuse of power, and ensuring that authoritarian
systems are made more transparent and accountability.

